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- // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
- /*
- * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
- */
- /*
- * Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation.
- */
- #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-fallback: " fmt
- #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
- #include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
- #include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
- #include <linux/blkdev.h>
- #include <linux/crypto.h>
- #include <linux/mempool.h>
- #include <linux/module.h>
- #include <linux/random.h>
- #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
- #include "blk-cgroup.h"
- #include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
- static unsigned int num_prealloc_bounce_pg = BIO_MAX_VECS;
- module_param(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, uint, 0);
- MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_bounce_pg,
- "Number of preallocated bounce pages for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
- static unsigned int blk_crypto_num_keyslots = 100;
- module_param_named(num_keyslots, blk_crypto_num_keyslots, uint, 0);
- MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_keyslots,
- "Number of keyslots for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
- static unsigned int num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs = 128;
- module_param(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs, uint, 0);
- MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_fallback_ctxs,
- "Number of preallocated bio fallback crypto contexts for blk-crypto to use during crypto API fallback");
- struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx {
- struct bio_crypt_ctx crypt_ctx;
- /*
- * Copy of the bvec_iter when this bio was submitted.
- * We only want to en/decrypt the part of the bio as described by the
- * bvec_iter upon submission because bio might be split before being
- * resubmitted
- */
- struct bvec_iter crypt_iter;
- union {
- struct {
- struct work_struct work;
- struct bio *bio;
- };
- struct {
- void *bi_private_orig;
- bio_end_io_t *bi_end_io_orig;
- };
- };
- };
- static struct kmem_cache *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache;
- static mempool_t *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool;
- /*
- * Allocating a crypto tfm during I/O can deadlock, so we have to preallocate
- * all of a mode's tfms when that mode starts being used. Since each mode may
- * need all the keyslots at some point, each mode needs its own tfm for each
- * keyslot; thus, a keyslot may contain tfms for multiple modes. However, to
- * match the behavior of real inline encryption hardware (which only supports a
- * single encryption context per keyslot), we only allow one tfm per keyslot to
- * be used at a time - the rest of the unused tfms have their keys cleared.
- */
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(tfms_init_lock);
- static bool tfms_inited[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
- static struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot {
- enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode;
- struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
- } *blk_crypto_keyslots;
- static struct blk_crypto_profile *blk_crypto_fallback_profile;
- static struct workqueue_struct *blk_crypto_wq;
- static mempool_t *blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool;
- static struct bio_set enc_bio_set;
- /*
- * This is the key we set when evicting a keyslot. This *should* be the all 0's
- * key, but AES-XTS rejects that key, so we use some random bytes instead.
- */
- static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
- static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot)
- {
- struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
- enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode;
- int err;
- WARN_ON(slotp->crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID);
- /* Clear the key in the skcipher */
- err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], blank_key,
- blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode].keysize);
- WARN_ON(err);
- slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID;
- }
- static int
- blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
- const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
- unsigned int slot)
- {
- struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
- const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode =
- key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode;
- int err;
- if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode &&
- slotp->crypto_mode != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
- blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
- slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
- err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->bytes,
- key->size);
- if (err) {
- blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
- return err;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
- const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
- unsigned int slot)
- {
- blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
- return 0;
- }
- static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops = {
- .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program,
- .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict,
- };
- static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio)
- {
- struct bio *src_bio = enc_bio->bi_private;
- struct page **pages = (struct page **)enc_bio->bi_io_vec;
- struct bio_vec *bv;
- unsigned int i;
- /*
- * Use the same trick as the alloc side to avoid the need for an extra
- * pages array.
- */
- bio_for_each_bvec_all(bv, enc_bio, i)
- pages[i] = bv->bv_page;
- i = mempool_free_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, (void **)pages,
- enc_bio->bi_vcnt);
- if (i < enc_bio->bi_vcnt)
- release_pages(pages + i, enc_bio->bi_vcnt - i);
- if (enc_bio->bi_status)
- cmpxchg(&src_bio->bi_status, 0, enc_bio->bi_status);
- bio_put(enc_bio);
- bio_endio(src_bio);
- }
- #define PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC (sizeof(struct bio_vec) / sizeof(struct page *))
- static struct bio *blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(struct bio *bio_src,
- unsigned int nr_segs, struct page ***pages_ret)
- {
- unsigned int memflags = memalloc_noio_save();
- unsigned int nr_allocated;
- struct page **pages;
- struct bio *bio;
- bio = bio_alloc_bioset(bio_src->bi_bdev, nr_segs, bio_src->bi_opf,
- GFP_NOIO, &enc_bio_set);
- if (bio_flagged(bio_src, BIO_REMAPPED))
- bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_REMAPPED);
- bio->bi_private = bio_src;
- bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio;
- bio->bi_ioprio = bio_src->bi_ioprio;
- bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
- bio->bi_write_stream = bio_src->bi_write_stream;
- bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_sector;
- bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src);
- /*
- * Move page array up in the allocated memory for the bio vecs as far as
- * possible so that we can start filling biovecs from the beginning
- * without overwriting the temporary page array.
- */
- static_assert(PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC > 1);
- pages = (struct page **)bio->bi_io_vec;
- pages += nr_segs * (PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC - 1);
- /*
- * Try a bulk allocation first. This could leave random pages in the
- * array unallocated, but we'll fix that up later in mempool_alloc_bulk.
- *
- * Note: alloc_pages_bulk needs the array to be zeroed, as it assumes
- * any non-zero slot already contains a valid allocation.
- */
- memset(pages, 0, sizeof(struct page *) * nr_segs);
- nr_allocated = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_segs, pages);
- if (nr_allocated < nr_segs)
- mempool_alloc_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, (void **)pages,
- nr_segs, nr_allocated);
- memalloc_noio_restore(memflags);
- *pages_ret = pages;
- return bio;
- }
- static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
- blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot)
- {
- const struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp =
- &blk_crypto_keyslots[blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)];
- return slotp->tfms[slotp->crypto_mode];
- }
- union blk_crypto_iv {
- __le64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
- u8 bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE];
- };
- static void blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
- union blk_crypto_iv *iv)
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
- iv->dun[i] = cpu_to_le64(dun[i]);
- }
- static void __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio,
- struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm)
- {
- struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context;
- int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
- SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm);
- u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
- struct scatterlist src, dst;
- union blk_crypto_iv iv;
- unsigned int nr_enc_pages, enc_idx;
- struct page **enc_pages;
- struct bio *enc_bio;
- unsigned int i;
- skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req,
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
- NULL, NULL);
- memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
- sg_init_table(&src, 1);
- sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &src, &dst, data_unit_size,
- iv.bytes);
- /*
- * Encrypt each page in the source bio. Because the source bio could
- * have bio_vecs that span more than a single page, but the encrypted
- * bios are limited to a single page per bio_vec, this can generate
- * more than a single encrypted bio per source bio.
- */
- new_bio:
- nr_enc_pages = min(bio_segments(src_bio), BIO_MAX_VECS);
- enc_bio = blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(src_bio, nr_enc_pages, &enc_pages);
- enc_idx = 0;
- for (;;) {
- struct bio_vec src_bv =
- bio_iter_iovec(src_bio, src_bio->bi_iter);
- struct page *enc_page = enc_pages[enc_idx];
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(src_bv.bv_len | src_bv.bv_offset,
- data_unit_size)) {
- enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_INVAL;
- goto out_free_enc_bio;
- }
- __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_page, src_bv.bv_len,
- src_bv.bv_offset);
- sg_set_page(&src, src_bv.bv_page, data_unit_size,
- src_bv.bv_offset);
- sg_set_page(&dst, enc_page, data_unit_size, src_bv.bv_offset);
- /*
- * Increment the index now that the encrypted page is added to
- * the bio. This is important for the error unwind path.
- */
- enc_idx++;
- /*
- * Encrypt each data unit in this page.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < src_bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) {
- blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
- if (crypto_skcipher_encrypt(ciph_req)) {
- enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
- goto out_free_enc_bio;
- }
- bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
- src.offset += data_unit_size;
- dst.offset += data_unit_size;
- }
- bio_advance_iter_single(src_bio, &src_bio->bi_iter,
- src_bv.bv_len);
- if (!src_bio->bi_iter.bi_size)
- break;
- if (enc_idx == nr_enc_pages) {
- /*
- * For each additional encrypted bio submitted,
- * increment the source bio's remaining count. Each
- * encrypted bio's completion handler calls bio_endio on
- * the source bio, so this keeps the source bio from
- * completing until the last encrypted bio does.
- */
- bio_inc_remaining(src_bio);
- submit_bio(enc_bio);
- goto new_bio;
- }
- }
- submit_bio(enc_bio);
- return;
- out_free_enc_bio:
- /*
- * Add the remaining pages to the bio so that the normal completion path
- * in blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio frees them. The exact data
- * layout does not matter for that, so don't bother iterating the source
- * bio.
- */
- for (; enc_idx < nr_enc_pages; enc_idx++)
- __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_pages[enc_idx], PAGE_SIZE, 0);
- bio_endio(enc_bio);
- }
- /*
- * The crypto API fallback's encryption routine.
- *
- * Allocate one or more bios for encryption, encrypt the input bio using the
- * crypto API, and submit the encrypted bios. Sets bio->bi_status and
- * completes the source bio on error
- */
- static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio)
- {
- struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context;
- struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot;
- blk_status_t status;
- status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
- bc->bc_key, &slot);
- if (status != BLK_STS_OK) {
- src_bio->bi_status = status;
- bio_endio(src_bio);
- return;
- }
- __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(src_bio,
- blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot));
- blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot);
- }
- static blk_status_t __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio,
- struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc, struct bvec_iter iter,
- struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm)
- {
- SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm);
- u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
- union blk_crypto_iv iv;
- struct scatterlist sg;
- struct bio_vec bv;
- const int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
- unsigned int i;
- skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req,
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
- NULL, NULL);
- memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
- sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &sg, &sg, data_unit_size,
- iv.bytes);
- /* Decrypt each segment in the bio */
- __bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter, iter) {
- struct page *page = bv.bv_page;
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size))
- return BLK_STS_INVAL;
- sg_set_page(&sg, page, data_unit_size, bv.bv_offset);
- /* Decrypt each data unit in the segment */
- for (i = 0; i < bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) {
- blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
- if (crypto_skcipher_decrypt(ciph_req))
- return BLK_STS_IOERR;
- bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
- sg.offset += data_unit_size;
- }
- }
- return BLK_STS_OK;
- }
- /*
- * The crypto API fallback's main decryption routine.
- *
- * Decrypts input bio in place, and calls bio_endio on the bio.
- */
- static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work)
- {
- struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx =
- container_of(work, struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, work);
- struct bio *bio = f_ctx->bio;
- struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = &f_ctx->crypt_ctx;
- struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot;
- blk_status_t status;
- status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
- bc->bc_key, &slot);
- if (status == BLK_STS_OK) {
- status = __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(bio, bc,
- f_ctx->crypt_iter,
- blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot));
- blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot);
- }
- mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool);
- bio->bi_status = status;
- bio_endio(bio);
- }
- /**
- * blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio - queue bio for fallback decryption
- *
- * @bio: the bio to queue
- *
- * Restore bi_private and bi_end_io, and queue the bio for decryption into a
- * workqueue, since this function will be called from an atomic context.
- */
- static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio(struct bio *bio)
- {
- struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx = bio->bi_private;
- bio->bi_private = f_ctx->bi_private_orig;
- bio->bi_end_io = f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig;
- /* If there was an IO error, don't queue for decrypt. */
- if (bio->bi_status) {
- mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool);
- bio_endio(bio);
- return;
- }
- INIT_WORK(&f_ctx->work, blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio);
- f_ctx->bio = bio;
- queue_work(blk_crypto_wq, &f_ctx->work);
- }
- /**
- * blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep - Prepare a bio to use fallback en/decryption
- * @bio: bio to prepare
- *
- * If bio is doing a WRITE operation, allocate one or more bios to contain the
- * encrypted payload and submit them.
- *
- * For a READ operation, mark the bio for decryption by using bi_private and
- * bi_end_io.
- *
- * In either case, this function will make the submitted bio(s) look like
- * regular bios (i.e. as if no encryption context was ever specified) for the
- * purposes of the rest of the stack except for blk-integrity (blk-integrity and
- * blk-crypto are not currently supported together).
- *
- * Return: true if @bio should be submitted to the driver by the caller, else
- * false. Sets bio->bi_status, calls bio_endio and returns false on error.
- */
- bool blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(struct bio *bio)
- {
- struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
- struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tfms_inited[bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode])) {
- /* User didn't call blk_crypto_start_using_key() first */
- bio_io_error(bio);
- return false;
- }
- if (!__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
- &bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg)) {
- bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP;
- bio_endio(bio);
- return false;
- }
- if (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE) {
- blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(bio);
- return false;
- }
- /*
- * bio READ case: Set up a f_ctx in the bio's bi_private and set the
- * bi_end_io appropriately to trigger decryption when the bio is ended.
- */
- f_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool, GFP_NOIO);
- f_ctx->crypt_ctx = *bc;
- f_ctx->crypt_iter = bio->bi_iter;
- f_ctx->bi_private_orig = bio->bi_private;
- f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig = bio->bi_end_io;
- bio->bi_private = (void *)f_ctx;
- bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio;
- bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio);
- return true;
- }
- int blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
- {
- return __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, key);
- }
- static bool blk_crypto_fallback_inited;
- static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void)
- {
- int i;
- int err;
- if (blk_crypto_fallback_inited)
- return 0;
- get_random_bytes(blank_key, sizeof(blank_key));
- err = bioset_init(&enc_bio_set, 64, 0, BIOSET_NEED_BVECS);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- /* Dynamic allocation is needed because of lockdep_register_key(). */
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile = kzalloc_obj(*blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
- if (!blk_crypto_fallback_profile) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto fail_free_bioset;
- }
- err = blk_crypto_profile_init(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
- blk_crypto_num_keyslots);
- if (err)
- goto fail_free_profile;
- err = -ENOMEM;
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile->ll_ops = blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops;
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE;
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile->key_types_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
- /* All blk-crypto modes have a crypto API fallback. */
- for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++)
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
- blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0;
- blk_crypto_wq = alloc_workqueue("blk_crypto_wq",
- WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI |
- WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, num_online_cpus());
- if (!blk_crypto_wq)
- goto fail_destroy_profile;
- blk_crypto_keyslots = kzalloc_objs(blk_crypto_keyslots[0],
- blk_crypto_num_keyslots);
- if (!blk_crypto_keyslots)
- goto fail_free_wq;
- blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool =
- mempool_create_page_pool(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, 0);
- if (!blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool)
- goto fail_free_keyslots;
- bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, 0);
- if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache)
- goto fail_free_bounce_page_pool;
- bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool =
- mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs,
- bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache);
- if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool)
- goto fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache;
- blk_crypto_fallback_inited = true;
- return 0;
- fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache:
- kmem_cache_destroy(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache);
- fail_free_bounce_page_pool:
- mempool_destroy(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool);
- fail_free_keyslots:
- kfree(blk_crypto_keyslots);
- fail_free_wq:
- destroy_workqueue(blk_crypto_wq);
- fail_destroy_profile:
- blk_crypto_profile_destroy(blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
- fail_free_profile:
- kfree(blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
- fail_free_bioset:
- bioset_exit(&enc_bio_set);
- out:
- return err;
- }
- /*
- * Prepare blk-crypto-fallback for the specified crypto mode.
- * Returns -ENOPKG if the needed crypto API support is missing.
- */
- int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num)
- {
- const char *cipher_str = blk_crypto_modes[mode_num].cipher_str;
- struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp;
- unsigned int i;
- int err = 0;
- /*
- * Fast path
- * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
- * for each i are visible before we try to access them.
- */
- if (likely(smp_load_acquire(&tfms_inited[mode_num])))
- return 0;
- mutex_lock(&tfms_init_lock);
- if (tfms_inited[mode_num])
- goto out;
- err = blk_crypto_fallback_init();
- if (err)
- goto out;
- for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
- slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
- slotp->tfms[mode_num] = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(cipher_str,
- 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num])) {
- err = PTR_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
- if (err == -ENOENT) {
- pr_warn_once("Missing crypto API support for \"%s\"\n",
- cipher_str);
- err = -ENOPKG;
- }
- slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
- goto out_free_tfms;
- }
- crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(slotp->tfms[mode_num],
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
- }
- /*
- * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
- * for each i are visible before we set tfms_inited[mode_num].
- */
- smp_store_release(&tfms_inited[mode_num], true);
- goto out;
- out_free_tfms:
- for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
- slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
- crypto_free_sync_skcipher(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
- slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
- }
- out:
- mutex_unlock(&tfms_init_lock);
- return err;
- }
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